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HARDWARE-BASED AND SOFTWARE-BASED SECURITY IN DIGITAL RIGHTS 
MANAGEMENT SOLUTIONS 
Maria Nickolova, Eugene Nickolov 
Abstract: The main requirements to DRM platforms implementing effective user experience and strong security 
measures to prevent unauthorized use of content are discussed. Comparison of hardware-based and software-
based platforms is made showing the general inherent advantages of hardware DRM solutions. Analysis and 
evaluation of the main flaws of hardware platforms are conducted, pointing out the possibilities to overcome them. 
The overview of the existing concepts for practical realization of hardware DRM protection reveals their 
advantages and disadvantages and the increasing demand for creation of multi-core architecture, which could 
assure an effective DRM protection without decreasing the user’s freedom and importing risks for end system 
security. 
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Introduction 
Security design is one of the most challenging areas for system designers because it requires an extraordinary 
effort to build a system offering strong security features but not hindering the working process of users and being 
well accepted by them. This is particularly true as far as the compromise between the content owner’s copyrights 
and the right of free access and exchange of information is concerned. The solution adopted in last decade is the 
digital rights management. Although most users don’t agree with the use of DRM, it is of critical importance for 
authors, publishers and content providers - their business depends on the ability to control and to charge for 
access to their content. 
Although the inherent insecurity of Internet, many upper-layer security protocols can be used to protect data 
during transmission but content is still at risk when it arrives at its destination. If the end device's boot process 
and critical information are not highly secure, the digital content can be stolen after the transmission and 
distributed without permission. This implies that end user devices must be built on a trusted platform and 
equipped with mechanisms for cryptographically validating the hardware environment and code signatures of 
downloaded software [1]. 
The DRM technologies allowing the protection of the content by access from unauthorized users could be divided 
into three groups: DRM implemented completely by software, DRM implemented completely by hardware, and 
the hybrid combinations of software and hardware. Certainly the most secure DRM is that which is implemented 
by hardware, the next most secure is the hybrid, and the least secure is via software. 
Main requirements to DRM platforms 
An effective DRM technology must provide a smooth and effective user experience for content use and in the 
same time must implement strong security measures to prevent unauthorized use of content [2]. The main 
requirements to it are: 
1. It must ensure fully protected capabilities, which means the protection functions should be performed as part of 
the boot process. Otherwise during boot-up malicious software can easily hook the control functions and 
compromise system integrity. If end devices receive content over a network, such malicious software could be 
masked as a firmware upgrade or Trojan, or hidden using rootkits. 
2. It must allow trusted integrity measurement and confirmation, that means the platform should own the 
capability to automatically check in real time during the boot all the new software and executable files in the 
system (certificates, digital signatures). Once this confirmation is done, the operating system loader can be 
started and the boot process proceeds as normal. 
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3. It must provide integrity reporting to notify the user about the results of the integrity measurement and possibly 
to prevent the user from playing back the DRM protected content in case of negative results from the integrity 
check. 
Obviously these requirements could be implemented by hardware and/or software means. 
Advantages of hardware-based DRM versus software-based 
The analysis of the commercially available technologies for DRM protection shows two main reasons to use 
hardware-based security of the protected content: better overall robustness and improved user experience. The 
main benefits of the hardware-based security robustness are: 
• Immunity from the inherent vulnerabilities and security holes of the used operating system. The security of 
all software applications is limited by the level of security provided by the underlying OS. Although the 
open and rich OS have bigger security challenges than a closed OS a hardware security module is an 
essential element to make the OS trustworthy. 
• Impossibility to access, change or uninstall security features. Attacks to DRM protection often start by 
targeting the protection software - trying to uninstall it or stop its activity [3]. Obviously hardware-based 
DRM protection cannot be uninstalled as it is hard coded into the chips. 
• Protected memory. Hardware-based DRM solutions manage the memory in a restricted manner and are 
able to prohibit access to it, providing better protection against attacks on the security mechanism. 
Software solutions use memory by the services of the operating system and several processes can access 
the same memory space simultaneously. Most OS provide some memory protection, but the safety of the 
memory space depends on the extent to which the operating system is robust and free of flaws. This is 
particularly important for the cryptographic algorithms which require the storage of the intermediate results 
during the execution of the cryptographic module. If the content of this temporary storage is exposed, the 
entire DRM system can be easily compromised. 
• Better performance. The hardware DRM protection could be optimized for maximum security and operate 
independently, not degrading the performance of the computer or consuming its resources. 
• Prevention of potential software conflicts. The software DRM protection is run on the same computer with 
many other security programs using together the same processor, memory, OS and other resources. This 
could provoke various conflicts resulting in poor performance and even in stopping the action of both DRM 
protection software and security programs. 
• Secure Storage. Hardware-based DRM protection is able to better protect sensitive data, such as private 
keys. A software DRM implementation cannot prevent the exposure of keys and therefore they could be 
relatively easily compromised. Even very strong cryptographic algorithms could be easily compromised by 
an direct or indirect attack to their software implementation. Only a proper hardware implementation, to 
which countermeasures against known attacks are added, could protect the secrecy and the integrity of 
the DRM mechanism. 
• True Random Number Generation. The software DRM technologies use pseudo-random numbers that 
decrease the security level of the DRM protection. As random numbers are used in DRM protection 
process for the creation of temporary and special values and are part of challenge response 
authentication, the better the random number generator, the more secure the DRM implementation. 
• Easier, faster and cheaper attacks to software DRM solutions. This is related to the security vulnerabilities, 
which are inherent for software modules and to the presence of many hackers who have enough time, 
knowledge and wish for breaking the relevant protection. 
• Quick dissemination. The compromising of software DRM solutions by only one hacker becomes quickly 
available for general use. The publishing in Internet of correspondent methodology allows it to be used by 
a lot of end-users before the manufacturer could take measures to remove the vulnerabilities in the 
protection, and to bring severe damage to operators, content providers and manufacturers. 
• Less susceptibility to reverse engineering. Hardware-based platforms are able to apply special measures 
that hide the data-dependent fluctuations in power consumption while software-based DRM solutions are 
more vulnerable to attacks based on power analysis. 
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• Most content applications like music, video and games require efficient and effective user experience 
which is the key factor for the success of consumer electronic devices and therefore for the acceptance of 
DRM by users. The main benefits of the hardware-based improvement of user experience are: 
• Superior performance in which user experience is prioritized without sacrificing security. Hardware 
solutions generally accelerate several times cryptographic functions (which are computation-intensive) in 
comparison with software solutions, making DRM security operations almost invisible for the end-user. 
• Optimization of CPU power and memory use. Although the computing power of modern processors 
increases constantly and should allow relatively fast handling of cryptographic functions, processors are 
designed mainly for new demanding applications such as video rendering and high quality graphics. 
Therefore software-based cryptographic operations are able to overload them and to worsen the user 
experience. There are some cryptographic operations (exchange of protocols with long keys, for example) 
that affect inadmissibly user experience. 
• Improved power consumption and memory use. The use of hardware-based DRM platforms allows the 
CPU to operate at a lower clock rate, saving power which is particularly important for battery powered 
mobile devices. Additionally, software-based solutions require more memory (code size needs large 
buffers) which affect the speed and the quality of other applications. 
Disadvantages of hardware-based DRM platforms 
• Software modification or creation of new software on a computer with hardware-based DRM technology 
may require hardware changes that could be slow and expensive. 
• The simple replacing of a peripheral device running protected content could cause a hardware-based 
DRM system to refuse to run software. 
• Network cards replacement could make a computer unusable until other necessary hardware 
modifications are done and passwords are reauthorized. This process may require the cooperation of 
several vendors. 
• If DRM protection is compromised reinstalling is impossible. 
• Manufacturers of hardware-based DRM are not able to warrant that DRM agents or their hardware 
assistants will not cause or help any safety or security failures. 
• More difficult implementation of extended usability. Software DRM implementations facilitate the making of 
the licensed content usable by a user anywhere in his personal network (local hard drive, media center, 
iPOD, cell phone, home entertainment center or burning to a CD), for the hardware-based it’s more difficult 
and expensive. 
• Higher security in hardware-based DRM solutions means higher costs, less interoperability, longer 
development cycles and potentially shorter market life. 
• Limited flexibility. It’s difficult to make hardware DEM systems open to new uses, new business models, or 
new rights created by content owners. 
It is clear that these flaws could be easily overcame and that only a hardware-based DRM implementation or a 
hybrid hardware/software solution could address all required security challenges while allowing seamless user 
experience [4]. 
Approaches for implementing hardware-based DRM 
Two main concepts have been developed by now: trusted system concept and multi-core concept. 
Trusted system concept 
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG), successor of the Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA), is an 
initiative led by AMD, IBM, Intel, Hewlett-Packard, Microsoft, Sony, and Sun Microsystems. Its aim is to develop 
and promote open, vendor-neutral, industry standard specifications for trusted computing building blocks and 
software interfaces across multiple platforms [5]. The new principles in the TCG architecture expand the range of 
entities that are able to use TCG features as a trust basis. These entities could include not only the direct user of 
the platform and the owner but also some remote entities wishing to interact with this platform. The TCG 
architecture introduces the mechanism of remote attestation which allows remote third parties to ask a platform 
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for details of its current software state. On the basis of the attestation made, third parties can decide to consider 
the platform’s configuration as trustworthy or not. If correctly implemented, this kind of remote attestation could 
become an important feature for DRM clients on open platforms as it may help a content provider when he makes 
a decision about the reliability of the client before the content is actually provided. What makes TC technology 
especially attractive for implementing DRM is its ability to enforce usage policies. Once their security conditions 
are violated, TC systems stop working. Since their security conditions are built as a “chain of trust” [6] containing 
hardware-locked keys and certificates from trusted third parties, they are hard to modify, at least much harder 
than software-based systems. If a DRM solution relies on a trusted system, it is easy to implement a hard-to-
break usage rights management chosen by content owners. TC technology is not necessary or sufficient to 
implement DRM but it can make implementing DRM easier and cheaper. An example of such a realization is the 
Intel Wireless Trusted Platform with the Certicom Security Architecture software. In this technology a special 
trusted platform module is built directly into the processor and provides secure key and password storage and 
protection. First, a secure boot process authenticates the hardware platform and the security architecture 
authentication module, then the module runs DRM applications and allows the users to access DRM protected 
content. The security architecture requires decoding the keys using information stored in secure hardware, to be 
able to access the content, after what these keys are used to decrypt and use the content, but only on the specific 
device. The encrypted content is not locked to this device, because another user is not able to use the content 
without paying to the content provider for having access to the rules for the content use [7]. 
 
Multi-core concept 
Intel’s Hyper-Threading technology allows parallel processing at thread-level on a single-core processor by 
sharing the processor’s resources. In Intel multi-core processor, each thread is processed independently by a 
separate dedicated processor, which allows full parallel execution at hardware-level and software-level and is 
very suitable for DRM applications [8]. 
In 2005 Intel embedded DRM capabilities within its dual-core processor Pentium D and allowed (theoretically) 
copyright holders to prevent unauthorized use and distribution of DRM protected materials [9]. But some 
functional problems with the distribution of jobs in the cores and in the chip-set when both cores are enabled 
caused applications to crash or hang and finally made hardware DRM capabilities unusable for real protection of 
content. The next stage in the implementation of hardware-based DRM in Intel’s products was Lenovo’s 
ThinkPad model, launched in 2006. It uses a combination of fingerprint sensor, trusted platform module chip and 
special software from Microsoft and Adobe to control access and distribution only of PDF documents. 
AMD also planned to incorporate DRM into future GPUs by blocking the access to the frame buffer and allowing 
access only to certain software from certain vendors but these plans didn't involve AMD multi-core processors 
because of the complexity of problems in sharing and synchronizing DRM-related actions. 
In 2006 IBM announced the technology Secure Blue intended for use in digital media players, electronic 
organizers, mobile phones, computers and devices where data is encrypted and decrypted as it runs through the 
processor and maintained encrypted in the device's RAM. Secure Blue requires a few circuits to be added to any 
processor design in order to enforce strict access controls at the hardware level. 
 
Conclusion 
It is obvious that DRM is becoming an integrated part of any copyright protected intellectual product in digital form 
and therefore DRM protection should be implemented in hardware and/or software assuring highest stability and 
performance as well as the best copyright protection possible. Different adopted solutions have many advantages 
and disadvantages but clearly show that it is impossible to realize well working solutions based only on software 
tools. Hardware-based platforms, especially those using multi-core processors demonstrate really promising 
features by improving user experience along with the robustness of DRM protection. Technology from a hardware 
standpoint is already in place, thanks to the efforts of various chipset manufacturers who have driven an evolution 
to support the benefits of parallel processing. Now research must be conducted to develop suitable multi-CPU 
architectures and multithreaded software that will guarantee the building of the perfect DRM system – fast, 
flawless and cheap - that can be neither broken nor avoided. 
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Introduction 
The impossibility of carrying out computer experiments opportunely constitutes the main problem of program 
optimization science. Their goal is to determine how often transformations can be applied in real programs, what 
effect can be achieved, and what strategy is the best to be applied for the specified set of optimizing 
transformations. At present, optimizing compilers are the only means of conducting such experiments [Bacon, 
1994] [GNU, 2007]. However, the period between the moment when a new transformation description is 
published and the moment when the realization of an optimizing compiler containing this transformation (if such a 
compiler is being developed) ends is so long that the results of computer experiments with this transformation 
appear to be out-of-date. Besides, an optimizing compiler usually contains a wide set of transformations and built-
in strategy of their application so it is impossible to obtain reliable results of computer experiments related to a 
particular transformation (not to the whole set) or other strategy. 
The absence of tools for conducting experiments results in transformations and transformation application 
strategies, whose characteristics are not known completely, being included in optimizing compilers. This 
adversely affects their making. Therefore to create a system for program transformation experiments aimed to 
